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EXPANSION OF NATIONAL BANK POWERS:
REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL
PRECEDENT UNDER THE NATIONAL

BANK ACT, GLASS-STEAGALL
ACT, AND BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT
by Jefrey D. Dunn
NFLATION and high market interest rates have revolutionized the
financial industry in the United States.I In response to rapidly changing financial needs of customers, the services offered by financial institutions2 have become increasingly diversified, rendering the differences

among the various institutions less pronounced. Competition for financial
assets has intensified among commercial banks,3 savings and loan associations,4 and credit unions,5 and between those institutions and nonde1. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH
CONG., IST SEss., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN A REVOLUTIONARY ERA (Comm. Print 1981)
[hereinafter cited as FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN A REVOLUTIONARY ERA].

2. Financial institutions are private corporations that purchase loans, debt securities,
and related financial assets. They are subdivided into (1) depository institutions, including
commercial banks, savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit unions,
and (2) nondepository institutions, including mutual funds, money market mutual funds, life
and property insurance companies, and pension funds. Depository institutions obtain funds
from the receipt of money deposits. Nondepository institutions, in contrast, obtain funds
from premiums, investment earnings, and other nondeposit sources. See P. ROSE & D. FRASER, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 132, 274-77, 314-15, 325-26, 403 (1980); HOUSE COMM. ON
BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., IST SEss., A REFERENCE GUIDE TO

BANKING AND FINANCE 19 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as A REFERENCE GUIDE
TO BANKING AND FINANCE].

3. Commercial banks include federally chartered national banks and state chartered
banks. These institutions accept demand deposits, make a wide range of commercial and
industrial loans, and engage in many other financial activities. See A REFERENCE GUIDE TO
BANKING AND FINANCE, supra note 2, at 8. National banks are supervised by the Comptroller of the Currency and are governed by the National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99
(codified in scattered sections of 12, 19, 31 U.S.C.). See generaly infra text accompanying
notes 15-27. State banks are governed by state statutes generally modeled after the National
Bank Act. See Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System (pt. 1), 52 VA. L. REV. 565, 567 (1966);
see also Scott, The Dual Banking System. A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L.
REv. 1 (1977).
4. Savings and loan associations are federal or state chartered companies that receive
deposits and generally invest in home mortgages and federal government securities. Federally chartered savings and loan associations are regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board pursuant to the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980). State chartered associations are governed by state statutes. See generally L.
KENDALL, THE SAVINGS AND LOAN BUSINESS: ITS PURPOSES, FUNCTIONS, AND ECONOMIC
JUSTIFICATION (1962).

5. Credit unions are cooperative organizations that pool deposits and make loans to
their members. Federally chartered credit unions are regulated by the National Credit
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pository financial investment firms. 6 As market pressures continue to push
financial institutions into a more competitive environment, Congress must
grapple with federal statutes and regulations that impede the efficient flow
of capital.
Commercial banks dominate the financial industry in terms of the
amount of financial assets they hold, 7 but the upheaval in the financial
marketplace threatens that dominance from two sides.8 One threat comes
from other depository institutions, including savings and loans and credit
unions. In recent years these "thrift" institutions have been armed by
Congress with statutory powers that closely resemble the powers once exclusively enjoyed by commercial banks. 9 A second and more serious competitive threat comes from nondepository investment firms.' 0 During
periods of inflation and high market interest rates these firms benefit as
bank customers transfer their cash and savings from low-interest checking
and savings accounts to high yield short-term investment funds. Although
federal and state securities laws apply to investment funds, these funds are
not subject to banking laws that require specified amounts of reserves and
interest rate ceilings on deposits."
In light of these trends, commercial bank directors and shareholders desire an overhaul of bank regulation. Although most commercial banks
would probably prefer to confine the thrifts to their traditional activities,
Union Administration pursuant to the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1795
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980). State chartered credit unions are governed by state statutes. See
generally GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DIv., CREDIT UNION NAT'L ASS'N, INC., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION ACT (1981); Edmonds & Rogow, Credit Unions:
Competition by Statute, 97 BANKING L.J. 426 (1980).
6. Investment firms engage in a variety of investment and securities activities including
mutual funds, bond funds, and money market funds. These institutions generally sell shares
in pooled funds and manage those funds by purchasing securities. See P. ROSE & D. FRASER, supra note 2, at 400-03. Investment firms are regulated by federal and state securities
laws.
7. See id. at 34, 142-43. At the end of 1977, commercial banks held financial assets
totalling $1.1 trillion. All other nonbank financial institutions combined held $1.6 trillion in
assets. Id. at 34.
8. For a discussion of recent competitive trends in the banking industry, see THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES (L. Goldberg & L. White eds.
1979); P. ROSE & D. FRASER, supra note 2, at 142-76, 433-48; SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF
COMMERCIAL BANKS (A. Sametz ed. 1981); see also Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1982, at 22, col. 1;
Feb. 17, 1982, at 22, col. 1; Feb. 22, 1982, at 22, col. 1; Mar. 1, 1982, at 22, col. 1; Mar. 4,
1982, at 24, col. 1; Mar. 9, 1982, at 24, col. 1 (a 6-part editorial series discussing banking
deregulation).
9. See Depository Institutions Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-22, 91 Stat. 49
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
10. See generally FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN A REVOLUTIONARY ERA, supra note 1, at
1-2, 5; see also House Votes Emergency Aid/or Ailing Savings & Loans; Senate Weighs
Broader Bill, 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2106, 2107 (1981).
11. In 1981 money market and other types of mutual funds experienced a 70% increase
in their assets over the 1980 level to $250 billion, making such funds the fourth largest
financial institution in the United States. See Mutual FundAssets Soared in 1981, Powered
by Money Market Funds, [Jan.-June] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 1, at A-13 to -14 (Jan. 4,
1982).
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and to extend the restrictive bank regulations to investment funds, Congress seems unwilling to endorse that approach. 12 Instead the trend in
Congress and the federal bank agencies has been to emphasize bank deregulation as a means of promoting a fair and efficient allocation of capital
resources. Deregulation encompasses two objectives, the elimination of interest ceilings on deposit accounts and the expansion of bank powers to
enhance service competition. The first objective has been reached in part
with the passage of title II of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980.13 Progress toward meeting the second objective, however, has been much slower.
This Comment examines the latter objective of bank deregulation with
respect to national banks. 14 Part I of this Comment examines the National
Bank Act of 1864, which governs the operations and powers of national
banks and restricts their activities to the traditional business of banking.
Part II examines the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which separates commercial banking from investment banking and prevents national banks from
engaging in most investment activities. Part III examines the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which permits banks operating in the holding
company format to engage in specified nonbanking activities that are
closely related to banking and are performed through a nonbank subsidiary of the bank holding company.
I.

THE NATIONAL BANK ACT OF

1864

The National Bank Act can be traced to the Civil War. 15 An antagonism towards banks, largely because of the turbulent political and economic history of banking during the first half of the nineteenth century
had culminated in the abandonment of federal banking laws.' 6 Federal
involvement in banking reemerged primarily because of the need for
12. See Liberation of the Bank Industry May Be Thwarted This Year by FracturedFinance Lobbies, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 187, 190 (1982).

13. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Title II
of the Act is codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3509 (Supp. IV 1980). For a discussion of the
deregulation of interest rate ceilings on deposits, see SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HousING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., DEPOSIT INTEREST RATE CEILINGS AND
HOUSING CREDIT, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON REG-

Q (Comm. Print 1979) (recommending that deposit interest rate ceilings be phased
out to permit market rates of return for depositors). See also THE DEREGULATION OF THE
BANKING AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES, supra note 8, at 168-77.
14. The 50 state banking laws are too numerous to analyze in the detail required. Nevertheless, the discussion in this Comment of the Glass-Steagall Act (Part II) applies equally
to state bank members of the Federal Reserve System, and the analysis of the Bank Holding
Company Act (Part III) applies to state banks operating in the bank holding company format whether or not the bank affiliate is a member of the Federal Reserve System.
ULATION

15. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, § 5, 13 Stat. 99, 100 (current version at scattered
sections of 12, 19, 31 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the history of the Act, see Levin, In Search
of the NationalBank Act, 97 BANKING L.J. 741 (1980).

16. For a discussion of the pre-Civil War history of banking in the United States, see R.
TIMBERLAKE, THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES (1978); J.
WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON BANKING LAW 1-19 (1976).
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sound and uniform money to finance the North's war effort. 17 Unlike
prior attempts to establish a single central bank, the National Bank Act
authorized private individuals to form "national banking associations"' 8
pursuant to federal charters issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency.' 9
Today the Act remains the governing foundation for national bank activities. Acting in accordance with the Comptroller's supervision, national
banks are organized for the purpose of "carrying on the business of banking."' 20 Although the Act does not expressly define the business of banking, it enumerates permissible activities traditionally connected to banking,
including the power to discount and negotiate promissory notes, drafts,
and bills of exchange, the power to loan money, and the power to receive
deposits. 2 ' In addition, the Act grants corporate powers relating to the
general management and operation of banks as business concerns 22 and
expressly prohibits or limits certain activities. These latter provisions indude a restriction on the holding of real estate23 and a prohibition on
capital and surplus to any
loaning more than ten percent of the bank's
24
individual, partnership, or corporation.
Finally, the Act requires national banks to defer to state law on such
matters as the propriety of branch banking 25 and the charging of maximum interest rates on certain types of loans. 26 In addition to the express
powers, the Act permits the directors of national banks "to exercise all
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking."' 27 When banks seek to engage in activities not expressly enumerated in one Act, they frequently rely upon the incidental powers clause
to justify the activity.
A.

Early Efforts to Construe the Meaning of the "Business of Banking"

Shortly after the passage of the National Bank Act, the meaning of the
incidental powers clause and the "business of banking" became the subject
17. See J. WHITE, supra note 16, at 18.
18. 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1976).
19. Id. §§ 26-27 (Supp. IV 1980) (Comptroller must issue charter before bank may commence the business of banking). For a discussion of the history and function of the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, see J. HEINBERG, THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION (1926); R. ROBERTSON,
THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK SUPERVISION: A HISTORICAL APPRAISAL (1968). The name
of the office is today a misnomer because it no longer supervises the money-creating activities of national banks. See J. WHITE, supra note 16, at 65-66.
20. 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1976).
21. Id. § 24(Seventh) (Supp. IV 1980).
22. Id. § 24(First) (power to adopt corporate seal), § 24(Second) (power to have succession), § 24(Third) (power to make contracts), § 24(Fourth) (power to sue and be sued),
§ 24(Fifth) (power to have directors and officers), § 24(Sixth) (power to prescribe bylaws),
§ 24(Eighth) (power to make charitable contributions) (1976).
23. Id. § 29 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
24. Id. § 84 (1976).
25. Id. § 36.
26. Id. § 85 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
27. Id. § 24(Seventh) (Supp. IV 1980); see infra text accompanying note 48.
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of litigation. Although most of the cases arose in the context of the debtorcreditor relationship between national banks and their customers, the early
judicial gloss on the clause emphasized basic policy considerations that
remain important today. In 1875 the United States Supreme Court in First
NationalBank v. National Exchange Bank 28 ruled that a national bank's
acceptance of railroad stock to settle a debt was incidental to the power to
incur liabilities and thus was within the incidental powers clause of the
National Bank Act. 29 The Court's opinion emphasized that a bank's incidental powers include the power to conduct its legitimate banking operations "safely and prudently" and that the ability to compromise a debt
30
properly serves that end.
In 1913 the Supreme Court in Clement NationalBank v. Vermont 3 1 concluded that a national bank's agreement to serve as an agent for a state in
the collection of a tax on savings deposits was incidental to the bank's
power to receive deposits. 32 The Court followed the policy of promoting
safe and prudent banking as a guideline in delineating the scope of the
incidental powers clause. The Court did not, however, expand the gloss
enunciated in NationalExchange Bank.
The Supreme Court in 1927 ruled on the propriety of a national bank's
purchase and sale of real estate mortgages and other debts. In First National Bank v. City of Hartford33 the Court upheld these activities under
the incidental powers clause on grounds that national banks have the express power with certain limitations to loan money on real estate mortgages. 34 Unlike the earlier cases, however, the Court impliedly considered
the prevalence of the activity as a factor in determining its legality. The
Court noted that one-third of national bank investments in 1924 consisted
of various 3 5government and corporate bonds similar to mortgage
investments.
Although these and other cases signalled a liberal judicial approach to
the incidental powers clause, 36 the widespread failure of banks preceding
the Depression brought a dramatic change of attitude. Over one thousand
banks failed during the last three months of 1931, 37 and bankers were
blamed in part for those failures.38 In 1934 the Supreme Court in Texas &
28. 92 U.S. 122 (1875).
29. Id. at 127.
30. Id.
31. 231 U.S. 120 (1913).

32. id. at 139-40.
33. 273 U.S. 548 (1927).
34. Id. at 560.
35. Id.
36. Compare Miller v. King, 233 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1912) (national bank may collect a
judgment on behalf of a depositor as an incidental power) and Wyman v. Wallace, 201 U.S.
230, 243 (1906) (national banks may borrow money as an incidental power) with First Nat'l
Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656-59 (1924) (national banks may not establish branches as
an incidental power if state law prohibits branches).
37. See R. ROBERTSON, supra note 19, at 121.
38. Id. at 118; see Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630-31 (1971).
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3 9 echoed the need for bank regulation to proPacific Railway v. Pottorff
mote a safe and sound banking system.
In Potorfa corporate depositor, after losing its savings in a failed bank,
claimed that it held secured creditor status against the bank's assets pursuant to an agreement in which the bank had pledged a part of its assets to
secure the depositor's account. The bank's receiver argued that the bank
had no power to pledge assets to secure private deposits, and the Supreme
Court agreed.4° Although the depositor contended that the bank's pledge
was an incidental power implied from the power to receive deposits, the
Court ruled that a pledge of assets was not "necessary" to the power to
receive deposits. 41 Moreover, the fact that the activity was "convenient" to
the performance of an express power, according to the Court, did not necessarily imply that it was within the incidental powers clause. 4 2 To buttress this result the Court noted that few banks engaged in the practice of
pledging assets to secure private deposits, 43 and concluded that "the immediate safety of unsecured creditors depends on the bank remaining open
and solvent; the pledge [of assets agreement] reduces the fund of quick
assets available to meet unusual demands without any assurance that the
deposit will be used to replenish this fund." 44

B. The Clash Between Comptroller Saxon and the Judiciary
Following World War II competition among financial institutions intensified largely as a result of the rise of nonbank financial intermediaries. To
meet this competitive challenge, national banks desired to enlarge the
scope of their customer services, but the National Bank Act seemed a formidable obstacle. Beginning in 1961, however, national banks found an
45
ally in the Comptroller's office with the appointment of James J. Saxon.
Comptroller Saxon supported the expansion of bank powers to improve
the competitive position of national banks, 4 6 and in a series of rulings he
authorized national banks to engage in the insurance business, courier
services, the travel agency business, the personal property leasing business,
and the data processing business. None of these activities was expressly
39. 291 U.S. 245 (1934).
40. Id. at 252-53.
41. Id. at 254.
42. Id. at 255 n.7. The argument presented to the Court was that the word "necessary"

in the incidental powers clause should be construed broadly by analogy to the Court's construction of the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (upholding the constitutionality of the Bank of the
United States). The Court in Pottorff rejected that argument on the grounds that the incidental powers clause is part of a statute rather than the Constitution. 291 U.S. at 259. The

same argument was raised and rejected again in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427,
430-31 (1st Cir. 1972).
43. 291 U.S. at 254.
44. Id. at 256.
45. See R. ROBERTSON, supra note 19, at 158.
46. Id. at 161-62; see also Saxon, Bank Expansion and Economic Growth: A New Perspective, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 597 (1963).
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authorized under the Act, but each was claimed to be authorized from an
expansive reading of the incidental powers clause.
A number of commentators during the 1960s supported a broad construction of the incidental powers clause, 47 which is one of several clauses
separated by semicolons in the first sentence of section 24, paragraph 7. of
the Act:
[A national bank] shall have power
Seventh. To exercise by its directors or duly authorized officers or
agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary
to carry on the business of banking; by discounting and negotiating
promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of
debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and
bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the provisions of this
48
chapter.
One supporter of broad construction noted that "[i]t
is an established principle of statutory construction that every clause separated by a semicolon
is of co-ordinate value, and that therefor each clause must be read separately in the sense that each clause must be given its own separate value
and effect."'4 9 Accordingly, the incidental powers clause was said to be
independently capable of justifying bank activities not expressly enumerated in the Act.
Nonbank competitors, however, viewed the broad reading of the incidental powers clause as contrary to the congressional intent to restrict
banks to traditional banking activities. They argued that the incidental
powers clause could not be read independently from the remaining clauses
in section 24, paragraph 7; instead, in their opinion the remaining clauses
served to restrict the scope of incidental powers to activities incidental to
express powers. 50 Notwithstanding the statutory construction arguments,
nonbank competitors turned to Congress to urge that section 24 be
amended to preclude Saxon's broad view of the range of permissible bank
powers. 5' That effort failed, however, and the nonbank competitors
47. See Huck, What is the Banking Business?, 21 Bus. LAW. 537 (1966); Beatty, What
Are the Legal Limits to the Expansion of NationalBank Services?, 86 BANKING L.J. 3 (1969);
Harfield, Sermon on Genesis 17.20, Exodus L'1O (A ProposalforTesting the Propriety ofExpanding Bank Services), 85 BANKING L.J. 565 (1968).
48. 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (Supp. IV 1980).
49. Huck, supra note 47, at 539.
50. Id. at 538-39; see To ProhibitBanks From PerformingCertain Nonbanking Services.Hearingson H.R.112, 117, and HR_ 10529 Before the Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and
Ins. of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12 (1966) [hereinater cited as 1966 Hearings](legal opinion of Legislative Reference Service of the Library
of Congress countering Ralph Huck's statutory construction of the incidental powers
clause). But see Harfield, supra note 47, at 576 (arguing that the incidental powers clause
expands upon the express powers granted in the subsequent clauses of the seventh paragraph
of § 24, and the express powers in the first six paragraphs of § 24). See supra note 22 and
infra text accompanying note 66.
51. See generaly 1966 Hearings,supra note 50; Legislation to ProhibitBanks From Performing Certain Nonbanking Services andFrom Engagingin the Business of PersonalProperty
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turned to the judiciary for relief.52
InsuranceActivities. The first case to challenge Saxon's rulings under the
National Bank Act was Saxon v. GeorgiaAssociation of Independent Insurance Agents, Inc. 53 That case involved a challenge to Saxon's ruling permitting national banks to act as insurance agents whenever such insurance
is incidental to a banking transaction. 54 The plaintiff insurance agents argued that the ruling was contrary to section 92 of the Act, which provides
in part:
[National banks] located and doing business in any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants . . .may,
under such rules as may be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent for any fire, life or other insurance company
authorized by the authorities of the State in which such bank is located . . .55
The agents argued that section 92 impliedly prohibited national banks
from engaging in insurance activities in towns with more than five thousand people.5 6 The Comptroller, in contrast, contended that although section 92 permits insurance activities in locations with less than five
thousand people, nothing in the Act prohibits such activities in locations
with more than five thousand people; hence his ruling merely legitimized a
power implied in the Act and authorized pursuant to the incidental powers
clause.
Leasing- Hearings on H.A 9822 Before the Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and Ins. of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
52. The first issue faced by the courts was standing. See, e.g., Webster Groves Trust Co.
v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966); First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. First Nat'l Bank of
E. N.C., 232 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.C. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir.
1965). The issue was resolved when the Supreme Court decided Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), a case in which the Eighth Circuit
denied standing to a group of data processing firms challenging a Comptroller's ruling permitting national banks to engage in data processing activities. 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1968).
The Supreme Court reversed and in so doing enlarged traditional standing requirements,
concluding that the data processing firms were in the category of aggrieved persons who
could protest the administrative action. Although the standing issue is settled as to nonbank
competitors, an implied private cause of action to enforce 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (Supp. IV
1980) was denied in Stein v. Galitz, 478 F. Supp. 517, 520-21 (N.D. I. 1978) (plaintiff
attempted to sue bank for damages following a prior "meritless" suit brought by the bank
against plaintiff). For a discussion of the standing issue raised in the National Bank Act and
Glass-Steagall cases, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 7374 (1978); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnaysis, 86 HARV. L. REV.
645, 688 n. 167 (1973); Stewart, The Reormation o/American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 1669, 1731-34 (1975).
53. 268 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Ga. 1967), af'd, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
54. 399 F.2d at 1012. Comptroller Ruling No. 7110 provided: "Incidental to the powers vested in them under 12 U.S.C. Sections 24, 84 and 371, National Banks have the authority to act as agent in the issuance of insurance which is incident to banking transactions.
Commissions received therefrom or service charges imposed therefor may be retained by the
bank." Id.
55. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1976).
56. The insurance agents justified their argument under the principle of statutory construction known as the expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule, 399 F.2d at 1013, which
negates the existence of any power found in one section of a statute that is specifically prohibited in another section.
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In Georgia Association the federal district court held for the insurance
agents, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed,5 7 relying extensively on the legislative history of section 92. The appellate court concluded that without section 92, national banks would have no power to act as insurance agents in
any community. 5 8 The court found support for that conclusion in Comptroller policy prior to Saxon's tenure,5 9 noting that even Saxon had impliedly recognized the tenuous merits of reliance upon the incidental
powers clause to support insurance activities prior to the promulgation of
the ruling.60 The Fifth Circuit also concluded that the incidental powers
clause could not confer powers greater than those conferred in other sections of the National Bank Act, 6 ' but did not elaborate on the substantive
content of the incidental powers clause because the decision was reached
solely upon a construction of section 92.62
CourierServices. The policy of "competitive equality" 63 between state and
.national banks has also resulted in litigation concerning limitations on the
permissible powers of national banks. In First National Bank v. Dickinson 64 the United States Supreme Court addressed a Comptroller ruling
that permitted a national bank to establish a receptacle at a shopping
center for night deposits of money and cash,65 which were to be removed
each day and sent by an armored car messenger to the bank. A regional
counsel for the Comptroller's office approved a conforming bank messenger service for a national bank in Florida as an incident to its banking
business, 66 but the state comptroller protested that the plan was in violation of Florida's prohibition on branch banking. 67 The national bank
brought suit for declaratory relief and an injunction against the state
comptroller. The federal district court held for the bank, 68 but on appeal,
the Fifth Circuit reversed, 69 ruling that section 36 of the National Bank
57. 268 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Ga. 1967), at'd,399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
58. 399 F.2d at 1013; see also Dresser v. Traders' Nat'l Bank, 165 Mass. 120, 42 N.E.
567 (1896) (holding ultra vires a contract where national bank sought to act as subagent on
an insurance contract), cited by the court at 399 F.2d at 1014.
59. 399 F.2d at 1016.

60. Id. at 1012.
61. Id. at 1013.
62. Id. The expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule was also applied to § 92 in Guaranty Mortgage Co. v. Z.I.D. Assocs., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 101, 104-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), to
prohibit a national bank's attempt to broker loans for the construction and permanent
financing of a hotel project. Id. National banks are not entirely prohibited from offering
insurance to their customers. In Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164
(D.C. Cir. 1979), the court recognized in a dictum that national banks may provide credit
life insurance as a permissible incidental power because "[it] is now commonplace and essential where ordinary loans on personal security are involved." Id. at 1170.
63. The concept of "competitive equality" prevents a disequilibrium of powers between
state and national banks. See First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 131 (1969); First
Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261 (1966).
64. 400 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1968), aft'd, 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
65. See 396 U.S. at 126 n.2 (setting out the Comptroller's ruling).
66. Id. at 126.
67. Id. at 129.
68. 400 F.2d at 552.
69. Id. at 558.
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Act makes state law determinative of what constitutes a branch bank and a
legally permissible branch banking practice. 70 The Fifth Circuit determined that under Florida law the71 installation of the receptacle was an unlawful form of branch banking.
The Supreme Court affirmed, 72 noting that although Congress has absolute authority over national banks, the National Bank Act itself defers to
state law on the propriety of branching. 73 While ruling that federal law
must determine what constitutes a branch, 74 the Court agreed with the
Fifth Circuit that the receptacles "received" deposits, and thus were
branches within section 36. 75 Neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme
Court discussed the branching issue in the context of the incidental powers
impliedly affirming the 1924 opinion in First NationalBank v.
clause, thus
Missouri,76 which held that the clause did not confer on national banks the
77
power to open branches in contravention of state law.
Travel Agency Activities. The first Comptroller ruling to obtain a direct
construction of the incidental powers clause, and as a consequence to develop a prospective standard under the clause, was Arnold Tours, Inc. v.
Camp.78 In that case forty-two travel agencies brought suit to invalidate a
Comptroller ruling that authorized national banks to engage in the travel
agency business. 79 Because the National Bank Act contained no express
provision on the subject of travel agency operations, the question
presented to the courts focused on whether the incidental powers clause
70. Id. at 556; see 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1976).
71. 400 F.2d at 557-58.
72. 396 U.S. at 138.
73. Id. at 133.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 137. Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart in separate dissents argued that the
decision on whether the receptacles constitute a branch should be deferred to the federal
Comptroller of the Currency. Id. at 140, 141.
76. 263 U.S. 640 (1924).
77. Id. at 659. The Court in FirstNationalBank v. Missouri concluded:
The mere multiplication of places where the powers of a bank may be exercised is not, in our opinion, a necessary incident of a banking business, within
the meaning of [the incidental powers clause). Moreover, the reasons adduced
against the existence of the power substantively are conclusive against its
existence incidentally; for it is wholly illogical to say that a power which by
fair construction of the statutes is found to be denied, nevertheless exists as an
incidental power. Certainly an incidental power can avail neither to create
powers which, if expressly or by reasonable implication, are withheld nor to
enlarge powers given; but only to carry into effect those which are granted.
Id. The Court's holding formed the substance for § 36 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 36 (1976) (requiring national banks to abide by state branching laws).
78. 286 F. Supp. 770 (D. Mass. 1968), aft'd, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), vacated, 397
U.S. 315, af'd on remand, 428 F.2d 359 (1st Cir.), rev'd and remanded, 400 U.S. 45 (1970),
338 F. Supp. 721 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972). See Note, Banks and Banking-IncidentalPowers of NationalBanks Under the NationalBank Act-Authority of National Banks to Operate Travel Agencies--JudicialReview of Administrative RegulationsArnold Tours Inc. v. Camp, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 206 (1973).
79. 472 F.2d at 428. The Comptroller's ruling was codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.7475 (1972)
(rescinded 1975). The Comptroller had permitted travel agency services to some extent as
early as 1959. 472 F.2d at 434.
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itself could justify the operation of travel agencies by national banks. The
First Circuit affirmed 80 the federal district court's ruling that travel agency
services were not authorized as an incidental power to the business of
banking.8 ' The appellate court dispensed with the argument that "great
weight" should be accorded to the Comptroller's interpretation of the incidental powers clause 82 by emphasizing the judiciary's responsibility in
construing statutes.8 3 Furthermore, the court criticized the Comptroller
84
for adopting the ruling without an accompanying written rationale.
Voicing the need "[to keep] the Comptroller from being 'a free-wheeling' agency,"' 85 the First Circuit established a two-part standard to determine the legality of an activity under the incidental powers clause. First,
as a minimum threshold requirement, the exercise of the power must be
"convenient or useful" to traditional bank activities. 86 Secondly, the activity must be "directly related" to the performance of one or more express
powers granted pursuant to the National Bank Act. 87 The court justified
Court in earlier
this standard as one impliedly adopted by the Supreme
88
opinions construing the incidental powers clause.
Applying the standard to travel agency operations, the court examined
the extent to which national banks were engaging in the travel agency
business. Finding that only 122 of 4,700 national banks had travel agency
80. 472 F.2d at 438.
81. 338 F. Supp. at 724.
82. 472 F.2d at 435 (citing Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 193 (1969) ("The Court may
not . . . abdicate its ultimate responsibility to construe the language employed by Congress"), and Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381, 387 (8th Cir. 1966) (upholding right of judicial review of Comptroller's rulings)).
83. 472 F.2d at 435.
84. Id. at 436.
85. Id. at 435 n.12 (citing Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381, 387 (8th
Cir. 1966)); see Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S. 411, 427-28 (1965)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
86. 472 F.2d at 432.
87. Id. The Court articulated the standard: "In our opinion . . . a national bank's
activity is authorized as an incidental power. . . if it is convenient or useful in connection
with the performance of one of the bank's established activities pursuant to its express powers under the National Bank Act." Id.
88. Id. at 431-32 (citing Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375-77 (1954)
(advertising of "savings" accounts directly related to express power to receive time and savings deposits and pay interest thereon); Colorado Nat 1 Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41, 49
(1940) (operation of safe deposit business directly related to express power to accept deposits); First Nat'l Bank v. City of Hartford, 273 U.S. 548, 559-60 (1927) (sale of mortgages
directly related to power to loan money and to discount and negotiate other evidences of
debt); Clement Nat'l Bank v. Vermont, 231 U.S. 120, 139-40 (1913) (incidental power to pay
taxes on behalf of depositors is directly related to express power to receive deposits); Miller
v. King, 223 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1912) (collection of judgment is not unconnected with the
banking business); Wyman v. Wallace, 201 U.S. 230, 243 (1906) (national banks have incidental power to borrow money); Auten v. United States Nat'l Bank, 174 U.S. 125, 141-42
(1899) (relationship between incidental power to borrow and creation of debtor-creditor relationship); First Nat'l Bank v. National Exchange Bank, 92 U.S. 122, 127-28 (1875) (power
to acquire stock in settlement of a claim is related to legitimate banking transaction);
Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 604, 648-49 (1870) (Court found the
certification of checks to be directly related to the express power to discount and negotiate
bills of exchange)).
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operations,8 9 the court concluded that this evidence did not persuasively
demonstrate that travel agency operations were convenient or useful to
normal banking functions. 90 Even if the court had found a larger number
of participating banks, the result would have most likely been the same
because no express power in the National Bank Act authorizes the operation of travel agencies. Thus, the second prong of the standard, requiring a
direct relation between the service and an express power under the Act,
would not have been satisfied. Although the court found the Comptroller's
ruling invalid,9 1 it did suggest that banks may provide traveller's banking
services, including the operation of something less than a "full-scale"
92
travel agency.
At least one national bank attempted to capitalize on a broad reading of
Arnold Tours, Inc. by establishing a "travel club," which it claimed was
less than a full-scale travel agency. Nonetheless, in American Society of
Travel-Agents, Inc. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Associa94
tion,93 a fedenl district court enjoined the bank from initiating its club.
The court in this case used the Arnold Tours, Inc. test, but interpreted it to
require courts to ascertain whether the risks involved were the "kinds of
risks Congress intended to prevent [a national bank] from taking."9 5 The
court viewed the National Bank Act as a statute through which Congress
intended "to shelter banking institutions from at least some of the forces of
the market which might undermine public confidence in banks and ultimately threaten their existence. ' 96 The court adopted this language from
Investment Company Institute v. Camp,97 although that case involved the
statutory construction of the Glass-Steagall Act rather than the incidental
powers clause. 98 It is not apparent from Arnold Tours, Inc. whether the
First Circuit intended the courts to use a risk analysis to determine the
propriety of an activity that is convenient or useful to an express banking
power; thus this case might be viewed as a departure from the two-part
standard announced in Arnold Tours, Inc.
PersonalPropertyLeasing. In 1977 the Ninth Circuit considered a challenge to a Comptroller ruling that permitted national banks to engage in
personal property leasing.99 ' In M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle FirstNa89. 472 F.2d at 435.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 438.
92. Id.

93. 385 F. Supp. 1084 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
94. Id. at 1092.
95. Id. at 1090.
96. Id. at 1089.

97. 401 U.S. 617 (1971); see infra text accompanying notes 145-62.
98. The court may have confused the Arnold Tours, Inc. construction of the incidental
powers clause with the Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp's construction of Glass-Steagall because
both are codified in 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
99. The Comptroller's ruling is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.3400 (1976). The Comptroller
also authorized operating subsidiaries of national banks to "lease property" pursuant to 12
C.F.R. § 7.7376 (1976). See M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d
1377, 1379 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
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tionalBank' various auto leasing companies brought suit to enjoin a national bank from engaging in authorized vehicle leasing activities.101 The
Ninth Circuit followed theArnold Tours, Inc. test, and, in a rare victory for
the Comptroller, upheld personal property leasing under certain circumstances as a power incidental to banking. 0 2 The court first noted the importance of personal property leasing activities as evidenced by a survey
indicating that over one thousand national banks had been engaging in
such activities.10 3 Having satisfied the convenient and useful portion of
the Arnold Tours, Inc. standard with this evidence, the court next concluded that the leasing activities were directly related to the express power
of a bank to loan money, because the leasing transaction in effect constituted a loan of money secured by the leased property.l°4
The Comptroller's success in M & M Leasing Corp. was also accompanied by language in the opinion that noted that the National Bank Act
"did not freeze the practices of national banks in their nineteenth century
forms," and should "permit the use of new ways of conducting the very old
business of banking."' 1 5 Notwithstanding this language favorable to the
Comptroller, the court refused to permit banks to engage in the short-term
car rental business or to become self-financing automobile dealers. 10 6 Further, the court limited bank offerings of personal property leasing services
to those that did not impose financial risks more burdensome than the
risks associated with ordinary loans.' 0 7 After narrowing the Comptroller's
ruling in this manner, the court chastised the Comptroller for failing to
"confine leasing within the channels of the 'business of banking'."' 0 8
Data ProcessingActivities. While the Ninth Circuit implied that a more
expansive approach to the incidental powers clause might be forthcoming,
the M & MLeasing Corp. case apparently did not result in a reversal of the
judicial trend against the Comptroller's rulings. In 1979 the Ninth Circuit
considered another incidental powers case, and in a cursory opinion, held
invalid a Comptroller ruling that permitted national banks to use data
processing equipment for the purpose of providing a wide range of data
processing services to the general public. In National Retailers Corp. v.
Valley National Bank 10 9 a private data processing corporation sought to
100. 391 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D. Wash. 1975), af'dinpart,rev'd inpart, 563 F.2d 1377 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978). See general, Case Comment, The Permissibility
of Leasing Under the National Bank Act: M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First National

Bank,

91 HARV. L. REv. 1347 (1978).

101. 563 F.2d at 1379.
102. Id. at 1380.
103. Id. at 1382.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1383.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1384. The Comptroller subsequently revised the personal property leasing
ruling to conform with the A& MLeasing Corp. decision. See 44 Fed. Reg. 22,393 (1979).
The new ruling is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.3400 (1981).
109. 411 F. Supp. 308 (D. Ariz. 1976), af'd, 604 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1979).
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enjoin a national bank from offering a "Retail Information Service" to the
public." 0 The Retail Information Service used electronic data processing
equipment to process applications for loans and other bank-related activities, and to offer publicly data processing services not related to bank functions. To avoid the procedural trap that snared the Comptroller in its prior
rulings, the Comptroller carefully promulgated the data processing ruling
by complying with appropriate notice-and-comment procedures."' Still,
the "wide latitude" of data processing activities permitted under the ruling
persuaded the district court that the services were not convenient or useful
12
to the performance of an express power under the National Bank Act."
The district court noted that the bank's Retail Information Service would
be properly incidental to the business of banking only if it were limited to
the processing of loans, accounts receivable, or other traditional bank
the conclusion and rationale of
functions.''3 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
14
the district court without qualification.'
Valley National Bank notwithstanding, the data processing controversy
is by no means resolved. Subsequent to the decision, the Comptroller refused to withdraw its data processing ruling or to narrow its scope.' ' 5 On
the day following the Valley NationalBank decision, the New Jersey Superior Court in Infocomp Corp. v. Somerset Trust Co. 116 upheld the power of
New Jersey state banks to engage in a broad range of data processing activities, including the preparation of real property tax assessment records,
tax accounting records, water and sewer assessments, and other services for
municipal governments." 7 Thus, in New Jersey at least, state banks are
permitted to offer publicly nonbank related data processing services, while
national banks located in that state are prohibited from so doing. In light
of the importance of computer technology and the ability of banks to offer
data processing services, future cases construing the incidental powers
clause will likely focus on data processing." 8
110. 411 F. Supp. at 310. The Comptroller's ruling on the use of data processing equipment and the furnishing of data processing services is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.3500 (1981).
111. 411 F. Supp. at 315; see 39 Fed. Reg. 14,195 (1974).
112. 411 F. Supp. at 314-15.
113. Id. at 315.
114. 604 F.2d at 32-34.
115. The data processing ruling was challenged again in Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 508 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), but the proceedings
were stayed pending a Federal Reserve Board decision on whether to approve the transfer of
the allegedly nonbanking data processing activities of the defendant bank to a nonbank
subsidiary of the bank's holding company. Id. at 93.
116. 165 N.J. Super. 382, 398 A.2d 557 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
117. Id. at 560-61. The Infocomp Corp. opinion, however, may be distinguished from
the Valley Nat'iBank case in that the New Jersey statutes expressly permit broad powers for
state banks. Id. at 560-61. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:9A-1 to -25.5 (West Supp. 19811982). Nonetheless, the decision does suggest a movement away from the "competitive
equality" policy between state and national banks, because only state banks in New Jersey
may engage in these activities. See supra note 63.
118. See supra note 115. See generaly Beatty, supra note 47; Bernard, New Directionsin
Bankcard Competition, 30 CATH. U.L. Rv. 65, 97-101 (1980); Harfield, supra note 47, at
578; Huck, supra note 47, at 543; Note, NationalBanks, Bank Holding Companies and Data
ProcessingServices, 14 GA. L. REV. 576 (1980).
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THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT OF

1933

Prior to 1927 the federal banking statutes were silent on whether national banks could engage in the investment banking business, including
the buying, selling, and underwriting of securities. Following the passage
of the National Bank Act, many banks entered the investment banking
business," 9 but two early Supreme Court cases temporarily ended the
practice. 120 Thereafter, national banks circumvented the restrictions on
their securities activities by performing those activities through a securities
affiliate of the parent bank. 121 That practice was legitimized in 1927 with
the passage of the McFadden Act, 122 but the 1929 stock market crash and
the subsequent nationwide string of bank failures revived concerns over
whether commercial banks should be permitted to engage in the risky investment banking business. Congress responded with the passage of the
Omnibus Banking Act of 1933,123 which included four sections designed to
separate commercial banking from investment banking. These four sections today are recognized under the popular name of the Glass-Steagall
24

Act.1

The purpose of the Glass-Steagall Act was to restore public confidence
in the financial stability of the commercial banking industry and to maintain the soundness of commercial banks by preventing them from dealing
in securities. 125 At the time, the separation of commercial banking from
investment banking was considered necessary because bank speculation in
weak securities allegedly played a significant role in causing the Depression.126 Although that rationale for Glass-Steagall is heavily criticized today, 127 the provisions of the Act effectively restrict national bank activities
119. See Rogowski, CommercialBanks and Municpal Revenue Bonds, 95 BANKING L.J.
155, 156 (1978); Glass-SteagallAct: A History of Its Legislative Originsand Regulatory Con-

struction, 92 BANKING L.J. 38, 39 (1975).
120. Logan County Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 139 U.S. 67 (1891) (bank has no power to
hold municipal bonds); California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362 (1897) (purchase or underwriting of stock not authorized under the National Bank Act).
121. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971); Rogowski, supra note
119, at 157.
122. Ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
123. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 18 U.S.C.).
124. See Plotkin, What Meaning Does Glass-SteagallHavefor Today's FinancialWorld?,
95 BANKING L.J. 404, 404 (1978).
125. See Clark & Saunders, JudicialInterpretationofGlass-Steagall- The Needfor LegislativeAction, 97 BANKING L.J. 721, 725 (1980) (purpose was to restore public confidence in

banking, maintain economic stability, prevent conflicts of interest); Karmel, Glass-Steagall:
Some CriticalReflections, 97 BANKING L.J. 631, 637 (1980) (purpose was to protect against
banking abuses, not to protect investment bankers from competition); Plotkin, supra note
124, at 407 (purpose was to protect commercial banks and investors).
126. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 634, 637 (1971); SECURITES AcTIVITES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS, supra note 8, at 23-24; Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1982, at 22, col.

1.
127. See Rogowski, supra note 119, at 158-59 (no empirical evidence on alleged violations of fiduciary responsibilities was uncovered). See generally Clark & Saunders, GlassSteagallRevised" The Impact on Banks, CapitalMarkets, and the Small Investor, 97 BANKING L.J. 811 (1980); KarmeL supra note 125.
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in most of the lucrative areas of the securities business.
The four sections of the Act are codified among the provisions of the
National Bank Act. Section 16 of Glass-Steagall prohibits national banks
from purchasing corporate equity securities, restricts the total amount of
debt securities that can be held by a bank for its own account, and prohibits the underwriting and dealing in securities with the exception of U.S.
Treasury obligations and general obligations of states, municipalities, and
other specified agencies.' 28 Section 20 of the Act prohibits national banks
from affiliating with securities companies. 29 Section 21, which has been
described as the "heart of Glass-Steagall,"1 30 provides that a crime is committed when a person engages simultaneously in the banking and securities businesses, except to the extent permitted in section 16.131 Finally,
section 32 prohibits interlocking directorates or other relationships be32
tween national banks and securities companies.'
Notwithstanding the intent of Glass-Steagall to separate the commercial
and investment banking businesses, the exceptions have provided numerous opportunities for national banks to erode that objective. Some investment activities, including dividend reinvestment plans, voluntary
investment plans, and individual management services, appear to be
clearly permissible activities.' 3 3 The legality of other activities, however,
has been greatly disputed. During the period when Comptroller Saxon
was attempting by regulation to expand the powers of national banks
under the incidental powers clause of the National Bank Act, he was also
Act.
issuing rulings authorizing an expansive reading of the Glass-Steagall
134
Those rulings were eventually challenged in the courts.
A. Revenue Bond Underwriting
Saxon's first encounter with the courts over Glass-Steagall involved the
legality of his 1963 ruling permitting national banks to underwrite municipal and other governmental revenue bonds.' 35 A number of investment
136
banking firms challenged the ruling in Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon,
arguing that the exception permitting commercial banks to underwrite
general obligation bonds of states and municipalities could not be broadened to include the underwriting of revenue bonds. Prior to 1963 the
128. 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (Supp. IV 1980). The Glass-Steagall portion of the paragraph is codified in the sentences following the first sentence. The first sentence of that
paragraph codifies the incidental powers clause of the National Bank Act. See supra text
accompanying note 48.
129. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1976).
130. See Plotkin, supra note 124, at 407-09.
131. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
132. Id. § 78 (1976).

133. See Clark & Saunders, supra note 125, at 721-22.
134. The first Supreme Court case to construe Glass-Steagall was Board of Governors of
Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947) (illegal interlocking directorate found).
135. The Comptroller's regulation is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1.3(e) (1963),
136. 261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966), affd sub nom. Port of New York Auth. v. Baker,
Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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Comptroller's office had taken the investment firms' position, considering
"general obligations" to mean only those obligations supported by the taxing power of the issuing state or municipality. 3 7 Revenue bonds, in contrast, were identified by the fact that they were supported by tolls or other
user fees.' 38 Saxon's ruling reversed prior Comptroller policy, and by rebanks to underwrite all govmoving the distinction he permitted national 139
ernment securities, including revenue bonds.
In Baker, Walls & Co. the federal district court held the ruling invalid,' 4° reasoning that Congress had intended to correct the "evils and
abuses" that led to Glass-Steagall by compelling "commercial banks to
return and confine themselves to their classic time-honored functions."' 4'
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, 42 concluding that
the 1933 congressional debate on the Glass-Steagall Act, the prior administrative distinction between general obligations and revenue bonds, and
the accepted trade meaning of general obligations did not justify Comptroller Saxon's broad construction of the Act.143 The court conceded that
revenue bonds were a novel form of financing during the Depression when
Glass-Steagall was passed, but concluded that Congress had intended to
limit bank underwriting activities too securities with "unquestioned
financial integrity," of which revenue bonds presumably were not.44
B.

Collective Investment Funds

In 1963 Comptroller Saxon issued a ruling permitting national banks to
operate collective investment funds.' 45 Those funds closely resembled
"open-end mutual funds" because they involved the collective investment
of securities with the bank acting as a managing agent for the investments.' 46 A group of open-end investment companies challenged the
Comptroller's ruling, arguing that such activities violated the Glass-Steagall Act. In Investment Company Institute v. Camp the federal district
court held the ruling invalid, 147 but the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, 148 concluding that the collective investment fund did not violate
federal banking laws. 149 The circuit court noted:
A commingled managing agency account is a descendant of the individual managing agency account and the common trust fund, fitting
137. 261 F. Supp. at 250.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 251.
140. Id. at 247.
141. Id. at 249.
142. 392 F.2d at 497.
143. Id. at 499, 502-04.
144. Id. at 501. See generally Rogowski, supra note 119.
145. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 622 n.7 (1971) (quoting the Comptroller's ruling); see also Saxon & Miller, Common Trust Funds, 53 GEO. L.J. 994 (1965).
146. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. at 622, 625 (1971).
147. 274 F. Supp. 624 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd, 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam),
rev'd, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
148. 420 F.2d at 91.
149. Id.
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within the traditional authority of banks to manage other people's
money in a fiduciary capacity sanctioned by the Federal Reserve Act.
Where the fiduciary tie between the bank and multiple principals is
looser, the Comptroller's regulations and the securities laws will take
up the slack.' 50
On further appeal, however, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
district court's opinion,' 51 reasoning that even though a national bank may
pool trust assets, act as a managing agent for individual customers, or
purchase stock for its customers, the combination of these services consti52
tuted an investment fund activity proscribed by Glass-Steagall.
In reaching that result the Court relied heavily on the legislative history
of Glass-Steagall and identified "subtle hazards" that Congress sought to
avoid by separating commercial banking from the investment banking
business.' 5 3 First, the court noted the "promotional and other pressures"
that might afflict banks engaging in investment securities activities if the
investments should prove to be unsound.' 54 To prevent a decline in public
confidence as a consequence of unwise investments, the Court stated that
Congress thought banks would have a "natural temptation to shore up the
affiliate through unsound loans or other aid."' 155 Second, the conflict of
interest arising in that situation was said to impair the impartiality of the
bank's role as a dispenser of credit.' 5 6 Third, the Court stated that Congress was concerned with the loss of customer goodwill that might result if
depositors lost money on investments made in reliance on the bank's
financial acumen. 1 Fourth, there was a fear that speculative investments
might be made and the banks might be tempted to make loans for the
purpose of enabling their customers to purchase stock recommended by
the bank.' 58 Finally, the court recognized an inherent conffict between the
investment banker's interest in selling a particular security, and the commercial banker's role in offering disinterested investment advice. 159 Although the Court conceded the need to "give great weight" to the
Comptroller's reasonable construction of Glass-Steagall, 60 it nonetheless
explained that deference was improper in this case because the Comptroller had failed to articulate a specific rationale for the ruling when it had
been promulgated.' 6 1 Thus Investment Company Institute v. Camp effectively settled the question of whether banks could engage in collective investment activities in favor of the securities industry.' 62
150. Id.
151.

401 U.S. at 639.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.at 630.
Id. at 630-3 1.
Id.at 631.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 632.
Id.at 633.
Id. at 626-27.
Id. at 627.
See also Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S.
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Automatic Investment Services

In 1974 Comptroller James E. Smith issued an opinion letter authorizing
a national bank to offer to its customers an automatic stock purchasing
service.' 63 The service permitted holders of checking accounts to authorize
the bank to deduct a certain amount of money automatically on a monthly
basis in order to invest those funds in one of twenty-five high quality
stocks. The customer would choose the stocks desired without receiving
any recommendations from the bank, and the bank would purchase and
hold the stock for its customer for a small service charge and a percentage
of the brokerage fee. 16
The New York Stock Exchange and a group of investment companies
brought suit to challenge the validity of the automatic investment service
under the Glass-Steagall Act. In New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v.
Smith 165 the federal district court upheld the Comptroller's authorization,
concluding that in contrast to the Comptroller's ruling held invalid in Investment Company Institute v. Camp, "this court has the benefit of a comprehensive and well-reasoned explanation of his ruling."' 166 The court
determined that the activity was not invalid because it "substantially
avoids the hazards Congress feared when it enacted the Glass-Steagall
Act" as well as the secondary hazards identified by the Supreme Court in
Investment Company Institute v. Camp. 167 That victory for the Comptroller was short-lived, however, because the Smith opinion was vacated on
appeal in New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Bloom. 168 In Bloom the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Comptroller's letter approving the
automatic investment service amounted to an informal ruling, and hence
was "not ripe for review."' 69 At present, the legality of automatic investment services offered by national banks remains unclear.
Although national banks and the Comptroller's office have not convinced the courts to construe Glass-Steagall broadly, a strong movement in
Congress is underway to reverse the result of the Glass-Steagall cases. In
particular, legislation is pending that would authorize national banks to
underwrite municipal revenue bonds and offer mutual funds as part of the
business of banking or as a nonbanking activity pursuant to a bank holding company subsidiary. 170 Many commentators have supported the re46 (1981) (bank holding company subsidiaries may engage in certain investment advisory
activities under the B= Holding Company Act), discussedinfra at text accompanying notes
257-74.
163. See New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091, 1092 (D.D.C. 1975),
vacatedsub nom. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978).

164. 404 F. Supp. at 1093.
165.
Bloom,
166.
167.
168.

404 F. Supp.
562 F.2d 736
404 F. Supp.
Id. at 1099.
562 F.2d 736

1091 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated sub nonL New York Stock Exch., Inc. v.
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978).
at 1097.
(D.C. Cir. 1977).

169. Id. at 740.
170. See, e.g., S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Sen. Jake Gan (R-

Utah)). The Garn Bill would enlarge the powers of national banks directly by permitting
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moval of the Glass-Steagall barrier between commercial banking and
investment banking on grounds that the barrier unduly restricts competition and inhibits market efficiency.' 7 ' The securities industry, in contrast,
remains adamant in its opposition to legislation expanding commercial
bank powers into the securities business. The latter group argues that national banks have unfair competitive advantages over securities firms because of their easy access to capital. Moreover, the many hazards and risks
associated with the combination of commercial and investment banking
activities, including the hazards identified in Investment Company Institute
v. Camp,172 remain formidableI7 3obstacles to the expansion of national bank
powers under Glass-Steagall.
III. THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1956
A bank holding company is a company that controls or is deemed to
control one or more banks under the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956.1 74 Today bank holding companies represent the dominant form of
banking in the United States, with bank subsidiaries holding 74.1 percent
of domestic commercial bank assets.' 75 Prior to the passage of the Act in
1956, controls over the formation and expansion of bank holding companies were nonexistent with the exception of certain supervisory and examining powers granted to the Federal Reserve Board under the Banking Act
entry into the securities business with respect to the operation and management of mutual
funds and money market funds, and the underwriting of municipal revenue bonds. See
PoliticsLikely to Stall Major Banking Reform Bills This Year, [Jan.-June] WASH. FIN. REP.
(BNA) No. 2, at C-I (Jan. 11, 1982). In contrast to the Gan Bill's approach, the Reagan
Administration has proposed a plan that would permit banks to engage in securities activities, but only if performed through nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies. See
Wall Street, Banks Split Over Requiring Banks to Set Up Securities Subsidiaries, [Jan.-June]
WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 8, at A-l to -3 (Feb. 22, 1982); see also Wall St. J., Feb. 11,
1982, at 6, col. 3.
171. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 125; Rogowski, supra note 119. See generally THE
DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES, supra note 8, at 273-89;
SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS, supra note 8, at 123-42.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 154-59.
173. See generally THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES,
supra note 8, at 273-89; SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS, supra note 8, at
123-42.
174. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 1841(a)(2) of the Act provides that a company controls a bank if:
(A) the company directly or indirectly or acting through one or more other
persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum or more of any
class of voting securities of the bank or company;
(B) the company controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors or trustees of the bank or company; or
(C) the Board determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the
company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies of the bank or company.
Id. The Board has promulgated rules under regulation Y for determining when a company
controls a bank pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.2 (1981).
See generally G. FISCHER, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES (1961); P. HELLER, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW (1976).
175. See P. ROSE & D. FRASER, supra note 2, at 153; Savage, Developments in Banking
Structure 1970-81, 68 FED. RESERVE BULL., Feb. 1982, at 77, 81-82.
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of 1933.176 Following the Depression, banks operating under the holding
company format discovered that many of the activities that were held to be
nonbanking activities under the National Bank Act could be performed
indirectly through a nonbank subsidiary of the holding company. That
circumvention of the National Bank Act, combined with the fear of growing economic concentration in the banking industry, led Congress to adopt
the Bank Holding Company 7Act
which implemented the present controls
7
on bank holding companies.
The original purpose of the Bank Holding Company Act was to define
and regulate bank holding companies and to require the divestment of
their nonbanking activities. 178 Under the Act, multibank holding companies were required to register with the Federal Reserve Board and submit
to extensive regulatory oversight from that agency. 179 During the 1960s,
however, when the courts were narrowly construing the scope of the commercial banking business under the National Bank Act and the GlassSteagall Act, a plethora of one-bank holding companies emerged in the
financial marketplace.' 8 0 Those holding companies and their nonbank
subsidiaries were free of regulatory restraints on their nonbanking activities because they were neither multibank holding companies subject to the
Act, nor "banks" subject to the National Bank Act and Glass-Steagall Act.
Congress responded to that loophole in 1970 by amending the Bank Holding Company Act to cover one-bank holding companies.' 8 1 In addition,
Congress implemented a dual standard in order to expand the range of
nonbank activities permitted under the Act.' 8 2 Congress rejected a proposal to enumerate a "laundry list" of permissible nonbank activities and
delegated the responsibility to the Federal Reserve Board. 83 Under the
1970 amendments nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies are
confined to activities that are "so closely related to banking or managing or
controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto."' 8 4 Since 1970 the
Board through Regulation Y has promulgated a list of thirteen permissible
176.
177.
178.
179.

P. ROSE & D. FRASER, supra note 2, at 155.
Id.
See G. FISCHER, supra note 174, at 61.
12 U.S.C. § 1844 (1976). The Federal Reserve Board is officially titled the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Id. § 241. The Board was created under the
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
180. STAFF REP. OF THE SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE, HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 93D CONG., IST SESS., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: REFORM AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 16 (Comm. Print 1973).
181. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat.

1760 (amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1849 (1964)).
182. See Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46,

55-58 (1981); National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d
1229, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1975); THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES, supra note 8, at 222. See generally Chase, The Emerging Financial Conglomerate:
Liberalization of the Bank Holding Company Act, 60 GEo. L.J. 1225 (1972); Comment, Implementation of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970: The Scope of Banking
Activities, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1170 (1973).
183. See P. ROSE & D. FRASER, supra note 2, at 466.
184. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976).
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nonbanking activities. 8 5 These include mortgage banking and financing
activities, industrial bank operations, loan servicing, trust company activities, investment and financial advising in certain situations, real and personal property leasing activities, the making of equity and debt
investments in certain corporations, data processing and bookkeeping
services, insurance agent activities, credit life insurance underwriting, courier services activities, management consulting in certain situations, and
86
the selling of money orders, travelers checks, and U.S. savings bonds.
Notwithstanding the approval of these services, a nonbank subsidiary of a
bank holding company is prohibited from extending credit to customers on
a condition that the borrower obtain some additional service from a nonbank subsidiary of the same holding company.' 8 7 The Board has also
promulgated a list of activities that are deemed to be not closely related to
banking. These activities include insurance premium funding, life insurance underwriting not sold in connection with a credit transaction, real
estate brokerage activities, land development activities, real estate syndicamanagetion, management consulting not otherwise permitted, property
88
ment, and the operation of savings and loan associations.1
In determining whether a nonbank activity is a proper incident to banking, the Act also requires the Board to make a net public benefits calculation. 8 9 That calculation, which is the second part of the two-part statutory
standard, requires the Board to consider whether the activity's performance by a nonbank subsidiary of a bank holding company will "produce
benefits to the public, such as greater convenience, increased competition,
or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue
concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, confficts of
interests, or unsound banking practices."1 90 Although the statutory language is unclear on how the Board is to handle the public benefits test
procedurally, the Board has decided to examine the public benefits inquiry
on a case-by-case basis.' 9 1 The cases construing the closely related clause
185. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1981).
186. Id.
187. The "anti-tie-in" restriction is codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1978 (1976). See
Costner v. Blount Nat'l Bank, 578 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1978) (loan for the purchase of an

auto agency may not be conditioned on the sale of the agency's installment paper to the
lender bank).
188. 12 C.F.R. § 225.126 (1981).

189. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976).
190. Id.
191. National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229,
1233 (D.C. Cir. 1975). A detailed analysis of the public benefits test and its case-by-case
application is beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally Independent Ins. Agents of
America, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 646 F.2d 868, 869-70 (4th Cir.
1981) (approving Board order permitting bank holding company to sell credit-related prop-

erty and casualty insurance on grounds that the public benefits test had been satisfied); Flor-

ida Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 591 F.2d 334, 34243 (5th Cir. 1979) (Board order permitting certain insurance activities for a holding company remanded for further consideration of public benefits test); Citicorp v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 589 F.2d 1182, 1189-90 (2d Cir.) (Board order denying holding
company's application to retain ownership of mortgage corporation upheld on grounds
Board properly found adverse effects outweigh public benefits), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929
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and the public benefits clause give considerably more deference to the
Board's rulings than the Comptroller has enjoyed under the National
Bank Act and the Glass-Steagall Act. The cases demonstrate, however,
that the judiciary is unwilling to permit the Board to stray too far from the
congressional intent to separate commercial banking from nonbanking
activities.
A.

Courier Services

In an early judicial challenge to the Board's discretionary authority
under its statutory powers, a private courier group petitioned the federal
courts for a review of a Board order permitting affiliates of a bank holding
company to provide certain courier services. The sole issue before the
court in National Courier Association v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System 192 was whether courier activities were "closely related" to
banking. 193 The Board order permitted courier activities in the context of
four situations, including: (1) the internal operations of the bank holding
company and its subsidiaries; (2) checks and other negotiable instruments;
(3) audit and accounting items of a banking or financial nature, and
(4) nonfinancially related materials when requests were unsolicited and the
94
services were not otherwise reasonably available.'
After reviewing the legislative history behind the 1970 amendments to
the Act, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that Congress had at
that time plainly intended to expand the range of nonbank activities permissible under the Act in comparison with the Act's policy prior to
1970.195 Nonetheless, the court refrained from supplying a judicial definition for the closely related clause and instead gave "considerable deference" to the Board to refine the definition "in a reasoned fashion
consistent with the legislative intent."' 196 Despite that deference, the court
set forth three factors for the Board to consider in making the required
connection between banking and proposed nonbanking activities,
including:
1. [Whether] [blanks generally have in fact provided the proposed
services.
2. [Whether] [b]anks generally provide services that are operationally or functionally so similar to the proposed services as to equip
them particularly well to provide the proposed service.
3. [Whether] [b]anks generally provide services that are so integrally
services as to require their provision in a sperelated to the proposed
cialized form. 197
(1979); Alcaly, Neither Convenient Nor Needed- The Convenience and Needs and Public Benefits Test of the Bank Holding CompanyAct, 96 BANKING L.J. 325 (1979) (concluding that the
Board's main focus is upon the competition factor and not the convenience factor).
192. 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
193. Id. at 1233-34.
194. d. at 1234-35.

195. Id. at 1236.
196. Id. at 1237.
197. Id.
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In applying the three factors to courier activities, the court concluded that
the requisite connections were properly made with respect to courier services involving banking material' 98 and the transporting of data processing
material, 99 but they were not satisfied with respect to the transporting of
nonfinancially related material, regardless of whether the transportation
was unsolicited or not otherwise reasonably available. 2°° As to the
nonfinancially related material, the court was concerned that the Board's
ruling would permit bank affiliates to engage in a general courier service
20
for their customers, a result inconsistent with congressional policy. '
Thus the Board's ruling was upheld with the exception of the fourth category of activities.
B.

InsuranceActivities

A challenge to a Board order that permitted bank holding companies to
act as insurance agents reached the Fifth Circuit in 1976 in Alabama Association of Insurance Agents, Inc. v. Board of Governors of FederalReserve
System. 202 The Board issued its insurance regulation in 1972, authorizing
bank holding companies to issue credit life insurance, credit health and
accident insurance, mortgage redemption insurance, property damage insurance on bond-financed assets, borrowers' liability insurance, and "conof the
venience" insurance.20 3 After finding that the promulgation
2 °4 the court
regulation complied with the Administrative Procedures Act,
regulation permitted activities that were
considered whether the Board's
20 5
closely related to banking.
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the legislative history behind the 1970
amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act, 2°6 cited National Courier
Association as authority for according great deference to the Board's decisions under the closely related clause, 20 7 and used the three-prong standard from that case to analyze the substantive validity of the order.20 8 The
court found portions of the regulation invalid, including the power of bank
holding companies to broker insurance for themselves or their nonbank
subsidiaries z2 9 and the power to sell any type of insurance under any conditions as "a matter of convenience." 2 10 The court also denied bank hold198. Id. at 1237-38.
199. Id. at 1238-39.
200. Id. at 1241, 1243.
201. Id. at 1241.
202. 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976), modoed, 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
203. 533 F.2d at 233.
204. Id. at 236; see 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
205. 533 F.2d at 237.
206. See supra note 181.
207. 533 F.2d at 240. The standard of judicial review was whether the Board's findings
were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance of law."
Id.
208. See supra text accompanying note 197.
209. 533 F.2d at 241.
210. Id. at 242.
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ing companies the power to sell general insurance through a nonbank
subsidiary in a town with less than five thousand people, but on rehearing,
2
vacated that part of its opinion. "
Despite its limitations on the Board's regulation, the court upheld the
power to issue liability insurance and property damage insurance to protect collateral used in connection with loans, reasoning that insurance in
such instances relates to an extension of credit and constitutes a legitimate
banking need.21 2 On rehearing, the court clarified this conclusion by stating that nonbank subsidiaries as well as bank subsidiaries could provide
such insurance. 2 13 The court also reviewed the elements of the public benefits test, 21 4 noting that the Board's findings would be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence 21 5 and if the reasons were clearly
explained. 2 16 With regard to the efficiency gains factor and the greater
convenience factor, the court found in this case that the Board's findings
were not supported by substantial evidence. 2 17 Substantial evidence did
exist, however, for the Board's findings of increased competition and an
absence of decreased or unfair competition, undue concentration of resources, and conflicts of interest.21 8 The court decided that the Board was
correct in its conclusion that the public benefits of the proposed insurance
activities outweighed their adverse effects. 2 19
C

PersonalPropertyLeasing and Travel Services

The Federal Reserve Board has been cautious in extending permissible
nonbank activities in comparison to the Comptroller's attitude toward the
expansion of national bank powers. For example, in 1971 the Board permitted bank holding companies to engage in the leasing of personal property and equipment on a full payout basis, 220 and although at least one
company had urged the Board to extend the regulation to non-full-payout
leasing activities, the Board refused. 22' Subsequently, in Bank America
211. 558 F.2d at 730-31; accord Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399
F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968) (national bank may not sell general insurance as part of the business of banking in localities with more than 5,000 inhabitants); see supra text accompanying
notes 53-62.
212. 533 F.2d at 244.
213. 558 F.2d at 730. The insurance regulation is presently codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.4(a)(9) (1981).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 189-90.
215. 533 F.2d at 246.
216. Id. at 247.
217. Id. at 248.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 252. For a discussion of recent issues concerning the insurance activities of
nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies, see Schweitzer & Halbrook, Insurance
Activities of Banks and Bank Holding Companies. A Survey of Current Issues and Regulations, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 743 (1979-1980).
220. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(6) (1981). A non-full-payout lease is "one in which the lessor
bank does not receive its investment back under the original lease." BankAmerica Corp. v.
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 491 F.2d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1974).
221. BankAmerica Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 491 F.2d 985, 987
(9th Cir. 1974).
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Corp. v. Board of Governors of FederalReserve System 222 the company
brought suit to challenge the denial of its application to engage in the computer equipment leasing business. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board's
order,223 concluding that the Board's denial of a hearing was not error,
that the Board's decision was rendered properly, and that the Board's conclusion regarding the closely related test was correct. 224 In a similar situation, an association of bank travel agents petitioned for review of a Board
decision that denied travel agency services a status of closely related to
banking activity. The Board found that travel agency activities were not
closely related to banking, and the court in Association of Bank Travel Bureaus, Inc. v. Board of Governors of FederalReserve System upheld the
2 25
decision.
D. Investment Advisory Activities
The United States Supreme Court in 1981 rendered its first decision concerning the interrelationship between the Bank Holding Company Act and
the Glass-Steagall Act in Board of Governors of FederalReserve System v.
Investment Company Institute.226 That case involved a challenge to a
Board ruling permitting bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries to act with certain limitations as investment advisors to closedend investment companies. 22 7 The Board promulgated its ruling following
the Supreme Court's decision prohibiting national banks from engaging in
open-end investment funds or mutual funds in Investment Company Institute v. Camp.228 By negative implication the Board reasoned that the
Camp decision permitted bank holding companies, as well as their subsidiaries, to act as investment advisors to closed-end investment companies
when the units of participation are arguably not securities within the
meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act.22 9 In contrast to the open-end investment company, a closed-end investment company does not issue shares
230
except upon its initial organization and does not redeem its shares.
Notwithstanding the distinction between open-end and closed-end investment companies, the same trade association of investment companies that
had challenged the Comptroller's ruling in the Camp case challenged the
Board's ruling on grounds that any investment advisory service performed
by a bank violated Glass-Steagall and, therefore, was not only outside the
business of banking, but also not closely related to banking under the
222. 491 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1974).
223. Id. at 988.
224. Id.
225. 568 F.2d 549, 550 (7th Cir. 1978); accord Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427
(1st Cir. 1972) (national banks prohibited from engaging in travel agency business as part of
the business of banking under National Bank Act); see supra text accompanying notes 78-98.
226. 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
227. Id. The regulation is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(5)(ii) (1981); see 450 U.S. at
49 n.3.
228. 401 U.S. 617 (1971); see supra text accompanying notes 145-62.

229. 450 U.S. at 52.
230. Id. at 51.
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Bank Holding Company Act.23 1
The District of Columbia Circuit Court did not agree that the Board's
ruling violated Glass-Steagall and reasoned that the Act applied only to
banks and not to bank holding companies. 232 Nonetheless, the court held
that the investment advisory activity permitted by the Board failed to satisfy the Bank Holding 2Company
Act's closely related test,233 and thus the
34
regulation was invalid.
In 1981 the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court. 235 The Court generally agreed with the circuit court that the investment advising approved
by the Board did not violate Glass-Steagall, 236 but reversed the result on
grounds that the investment advisory activities were closely related to
banking under the Bank Holding Company Act.237 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens reiterated the legislative history of the 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act 238 and concluded that those
amendments neither expanded nor reduced the prohibitions of Glass-Steagall. 239 Consequently, the Court stated that if a securities-related activity
is not prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act, then the Board has discretion
to permit bank holding company subsidiaries to engage in such activities
when the activities are closely related to banking. 24° Moreover, the Court
stated that even if the activity would violate Glass-Steagall, the prohibition
would not necessarily prevent the Board from authorizing bank holding
companies to engage in such activities pursuant to the closely related
clause. 24 ' The Court deferred to the Board's discretion in determining
whether the closely related standard had been met 242 and did not comment
upon the meaning of that standard or whether the gloss provided by National Courier Association was correct.
The significance of Board of Governors of FederalReserve System v. Investment Company Institute is twofold. First, an expansive reading of that
231. Id. at 58-60.
232. 606 F.2d 1004, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
233. 606 F.2d at 1023-24.
234. The court reached this result by examining the legislative policies behind the 1970
amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act. See supra note 181. It found that the
main goals of the amendments were to extend coverage of the Act to one-bank holding
companies, which had previously been exempt from regulation, to end nonbank subsidiaries abusive treatment of bank subsidiaries, and to prevent the "centralization of economic
power in the American economy." 606 F.2d at 1023. Applying this rationale to the Board's
ruling, the court concluded that the power of bank holding companies to make investment
decisions in this situation would be inconsistent with the goal of the amendments. Id.

235. 450 U.S. at 78.
236. Id. at 59-60. The Court went one step further, however, by ruling that a bank subsidiary of a bank holding company may perform the investment advisory services authorized by the Board without violating Glass-Steagall. Id. at 60. The Court reasoned that the
Board's ruling did not authorize the sale or distribution of securities nor the purchase of
securities from an investment company, either of which would have violated Glass-Steagall.
Id. at 62.
237. Id. at 78.
238. Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1849 (1964)).
239. 450 U.S. at 74-75.
240. Id. at 76-77.
241. Id. at 63-64.
242. Id. at 77-78.
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case suggests that Glass-Steagall does not prohibit national banks, or bank
and nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies, from engaging in
investment advisory services to closed-end investment companies. 243 Secondly, the gloss on the closely related test from National Courier Association appears to have survived as an acceptable method for determining
whether a bank or nonbank subsidiary of a bank holding company may
engage in a nonbank activity that is closely related to banking under the
Bank Holding Company Act. The Court's deference suggests that in the
future the judiciary might accord even greater weight to the Board's determination on the issue of what constitutes a closely related activity.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has traced the regulatory and judicial construction of the
National Bank Act, the Glass-Steagall Act, and the Bank Holding Company Act to provide an overview of the restrictions on national bank powers under the present federal bank regulatory scheme. Confronted with
competition from savings and loan associations and credit unions on the
one hand, and securities firms on the other, national banks have found
their position in the financial markets threatened with a loss of deposits
and an inability to compete effectively. Although the federal bank regulatory agencies have attempted by administrative fiat to expand the powers
of national banks and the nonbanking activities of nonbank subsidiaries of
bank holding companies, the judiciary has narrowly construed the federal
banking statutes in accordance with its view of congressional policy. Accordingly, the expansion of national bank powers is an issue Congress
must confront.
Under the present statutory framework governing national banks, at
least two approaches exist for expanding national bank powers. One approach is to amend the National Bank Act or the Glass-Steagall Act or
both to permit national banks to engage in new activities as express powers
within the range of activities permitted under the traditional business of
banking. A second approach is to retain nontraditional banking activities
outside the realm of the banking business, but to permit those activities to
be performed by nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies under
the Bank Holding Company Act. The latter approach will entail greater
regulatory burdens on the banking industry, but it might be viewed as a
significant first step toward the direct expansion of bank powers. Moreover, in the area of securities activities, the holding company subsidiary
approach might serve to buffer the bank subsidiary from some of the risks
and conflicts of interest that led to the separation of commercial and investment banking during the Depression.
243. In a case subsequent to Board of Governors ofFed Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co.
Inst., a federal district court declared as contrary to law a Board order permitting the sale of
third-party commercial paper by commercial banks, concluding that commercial paper is an
investment security. A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 519 F.
Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1981). The court refused to consider whether the bank was in violation
of Glass-Steagall. Id. at 616 n. 10.

